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	<title>Comments for Surfing Samurai Robots</title>
	<link>http://susaro.com</link>
	<description>Safe and Friendly Artificial Intelligence</description>
	<pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2008 08:52:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>Comment on Preserving Goals in AI:  First You Sort Out The Definitions, Then You Do The Math (not vice versa). by Stan Nilsen</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/28#comment-111</link>
		<dc:creator>Stan Nilsen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 15:49:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/28#comment-111</guid>
		<description>The prospect of determining motivation is an exciting promise for AGI. Why did the smart unit do that?  My preference is to keep this as a design criteria.  On the goal side of the AGI I would expect to find a stack architecture revealing what method invoked another method.  
The selection criteria for a method then becomes the motivation for engaging the method. You look for the selection criteria in the method that was "in control" prior to this method. 

My guess is that this restricts the use of neural network architecture for selection of methods.  It has been problematic for humans to determine "what" was the controlling factor at the time a decision was made - "debug" tags may make that less of a problem with artificial "thinking."

Is it commonly accepted that we won't be able to extract motivation from an AGI?  That we must attempt to infer?  Why not instrument?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The prospect of determining motivation is an exciting promise for AGI. Why did the smart unit do that?  My preference is to keep this as a design criteria.  On the goal side of the AGI I would expect to find a stack architecture revealing what method invoked another method.<br />
The selection criteria for a method then becomes the motivation for engaging the method. You look for the selection criteria in the method that was &#8220;in control&#8221; prior to this method. </p>
<p>My guess is that this restricts the use of neural network architecture for selection of methods.  It has been problematic for humans to determine &#8220;what&#8221; was the controlling factor at the time a decision was made - &#8220;debug&#8221; tags may make that less of a problem with artificial &#8220;thinking.&#8221;</p>
<p>Is it commonly accepted that we won&#8217;t be able to extract motivation from an AGI?  That we must attempt to infer?  Why not instrument?</p>
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		<title>Comment on Preserving Goals in AI:  First You Sort Out The Definitions, Then You Do The Math (not vice versa). by Mentifex</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/28#comment-110</link>
		<dc:creator>Mentifex</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2008 03:34:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/28#comment-110</guid>
		<description>Just checking in to see what is new here.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Just checking in to see what is new here.</p>
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		<title>Comment on An Open Letter to AGI Investors by Some Rates are Fixed &#124; Ultratech Memes</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/23#comment-96</link>
		<dc:creator>Some Rates are Fixed &#124; Ultratech Memes</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 15:45:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/23#comment-96</guid>
		<description>[...] Kurzweilian argument for what will happen once someone perfects artificial general intelligence (source): If anyone can build a full-up, human level AGI, that system will be able to invent new knowledge [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] Kurzweilian argument for what will happen once someone perfects artificial general intelligence (source): If anyone can build a full-up, human level AGI, that system will be able to invent new knowledge [&#8230;]</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-65</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2008 01:28:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-65</guid>
		<description>I posted the comment before I saw the new entry, which will surely be helpful as I continue to think about what you are saying.

I am having some difficulty now reconciling "It is almost always possible to drill down into a system and find some complexity somewhere" with the statement here that the choice of regularities really doesn't matter... but I'll think on it further.  I'm also at the moment rather uncomfortable with the appeal to "delicate sensibilities" and "tangled" as part of defining "untouchable" mathematics.  It might take me a while to reforumulate that in a way that makes sense to my own delicate sensibilities.

I'll be working on that and following along, but probably with fewer barrages of public bewilderment.  Thanks for listening to my questions.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I posted the comment before I saw the new entry, which will surely be helpful as I continue to think about what you are saying.</p>
<p>I am having some difficulty now reconciling &#8220;It is almost always possible to drill down into a system and find some complexity somewhere&#8221; with the statement here that the choice of regularities really doesn&#8217;t matter&#8230; but I&#8217;ll think on it further.  I&#8217;m also at the moment rather uncomfortable with the appeal to &#8220;delicate sensibilities&#8221; and &#8220;tangled&#8221; as part of defining &#8220;untouchable&#8221; mathematics.  It might take me a while to reforumulate that in a way that makes sense to my own delicate sensibilities.</p>
<p>I&#8217;ll be working on that and following along, but probably with fewer barrages of public bewilderment.  Thanks for listening to my questions.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Richard Loosemore</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-64</link>
		<dc:creator>Richard Loosemore</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 22:22:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-64</guid>
		<description>I am not sure if your above comment came before or after the next post, which tries to answer some of these thoughts.

My only comment here would be to say that, yes, people have different opinions on which 'regularities' might need explaining, but that this really does not matter.  If a system shows anything more interesting than random behavior, then that behavior could, in principle, be explained.  The only question of importance in our context is:  are explanations always small enough that human minds can find them and write them down, or could it be that sometimes the smallest possible explanation that can be found (for a particular system) is too large to be feasibly discovered?

That is the only issue that is important.  Hypothetically, such systems could exist.  See today's post for more on that.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am not sure if your above comment came before or after the next post, which tries to answer some of these thoughts.</p>
<p>My only comment here would be to say that, yes, people have different opinions on which &#8216;regularities&#8217; might need explaining, but that this really does not matter.  If a system shows anything more interesting than random behavior, then that behavior could, in principle, be explained.  The only question of importance in our context is:  are explanations always small enough that human minds can find them and write them down, or could it be that sometimes the smallest possible explanation that can be found (for a particular system) is too large to be feasibly discovered?</p>
<p>That is the only issue that is important.  Hypothetically, such systems could exist.  See today&#8217;s post for more on that.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-62</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2008 18:13:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-62</guid>
		<description>As I seem to be having some success with recent rephrasings of complexity as the term is used in this argument, I'll quickly attempt to address the confusions I have posted about recently here.

The first issue has to do with whether certain systems (the craps table, an advanced fighter airplane, the three-body gravitational systems, and so on) "are complex".  This depends crucially on the nature of the regularities that an observer finds worth considering (that is, that seem to "demand an explanation").  Among reasonable people with similar goals, there is likely to be agreement about which regularities those are; in other cases, the theory size required may vary greatly depending on the properties that a scientist finds interesting and the degree to which they have to be explained by a theory.

In practice, this relativity will be a cause for heated discussion among individuals, but it should become clear with discussion exactly where disagreement lies:  what are the specific local mechanisms of interest?  what are the specific global regularities that demand an explanation?  what must the explanation do to be satisfying?  and then how big does an explanatory theory appear to be? (and thus, how important is complexity to the phenomena under study?)

Regarding the Mandelbrot set, it seems to me that the definition could be extended to cover such abstract entities if desired, but given that the purpose of your argument has little to do with such things, there's no apparent benefit to screwing around with that.

So, if you think I've basically got this stuff right, I can move on to trying to understand untouchable mathematics.

Sorry if I seem sort of idiotic; I find that truly trying to understand somebody else's ideas from their own point of view is quite difficult unless they magically match up with my own ways of thinking.  I suspect it is also often difficult for others also, and the effort is therefore rarely made (unless compelled by school or work).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As I seem to be having some success with recent rephrasings of complexity as the term is used in this argument, I&#8217;ll quickly attempt to address the confusions I have posted about recently here.</p>
<p>The first issue has to do with whether certain systems (the craps table, an advanced fighter airplane, the three-body gravitational systems, and so on) &#8220;are complex&#8221;.  This depends crucially on the nature of the regularities that an observer finds worth considering (that is, that seem to &#8220;demand an explanation&#8221;).  Among reasonable people with similar goals, there is likely to be agreement about which regularities those are; in other cases, the theory size required may vary greatly depending on the properties that a scientist finds interesting and the degree to which they have to be explained by a theory.</p>
<p>In practice, this relativity will be a cause for heated discussion among individuals, but it should become clear with discussion exactly where disagreement lies:  what are the specific local mechanisms of interest?  what are the specific global regularities that demand an explanation?  what must the explanation do to be satisfying?  and then how big does an explanatory theory appear to be? (and thus, how important is complexity to the phenomena under study?)</p>
<p>Regarding the Mandelbrot set, it seems to me that the definition could be extended to cover such abstract entities if desired, but given that the purpose of your argument has little to do with such things, there&#8217;s no apparent benefit to screwing around with that.</p>
<p>So, if you think I&#8217;ve basically got this stuff right, I can move on to trying to understand untouchable mathematics.</p>
<p>Sorry if I seem sort of idiotic; I find that truly trying to understand somebody else&#8217;s ideas from their own point of view is quite difficult unless they magically match up with my own ways of thinking.  I suspect it is also often difficult for others also, and the effort is therefore rarely made (unless compelled by school or work).</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-56</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 21:54:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-56</guid>
		<description>Reading a bit about the three body problem, it appears that scientists and mathematicians do in fact find the three body problem interesting because of certain rare degenerative cases which appear to be treated as global regularities.  I'm not completely sure why those cases make the problem complex where the cases of throwing dice that end up, say, with one die on top of another, are not, but I'll let it pass.  Perhaps it is the small size of the theory for solving the degenerative regular cases that makes the general problem complex?  That doesn't seem quite right to me because I get the impression that a reductionistic explanation for some system states is a much different thing than complexity.

But now I'm just confused again.  I promise it is not on purpose.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Reading a bit about the three body problem, it appears that scientists and mathematicians do in fact find the three body problem interesting because of certain rare degenerative cases which appear to be treated as global regularities.  I&#8217;m not completely sure why those cases make the problem complex where the cases of throwing dice that end up, say, with one die on top of another, are not, but I&#8217;ll let it pass.  Perhaps it is the small size of the theory for solving the degenerative regular cases that makes the general problem complex?  That doesn&#8217;t seem quite right to me because I get the impression that a reductionistic explanation for some system states is a much different thing than complexity.</p>
<p>But now I&#8217;m just confused again.  I promise it is not on purpose.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-55</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 21:36:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-55</guid>
		<description>Oh, on the AGI list, Mark Waser (who says he understands your notion of complexity and the argument you are making) writes:

&#62; I am also sure that it applies but don't 
&#62; believe that it is a huge problem unless 
&#62; you ignore it.  Remember, gravity with 
&#62; three bodies is a complex problem 

Is that right (gravity with three bodies is a complex problem)?  I don't see what the global regularities demanding explanation would be in the case of the three body problem.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh, on the AGI list, Mark Waser (who says he understands your notion of complexity and the argument you are making) writes:</p>
<p>&gt; I am also sure that it applies but don&#8217;t<br />
&gt; believe that it is a huge problem unless<br />
&gt; you ignore it.  Remember, gravity with<br />
&gt; three bodies is a complex problem </p>
<p>Is that right (gravity with three bodies is a complex problem)?  I don&#8217;t see what the global regularities demanding explanation would be in the case of the three body problem.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-54</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 19:49:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-54</guid>
		<description>Sorry to fill up your blog with posts, hopefully it is not too annoying.

Regarding the Mandelbrot Set question:  naively, it seems to me like a great example of complexity -- with very interesting global regularities in the images, but it's not really a "system" in the sense you seem to be talking about.... no bunches of interacting elements, no dynamic "behavior".  With this question I'm trying to probe the sorts of things your definition applies to.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Sorry to fill up your blog with posts, hopefully it is not too annoying.</p>
<p>Regarding the Mandelbrot Set question:  naively, it seems to me like a great example of complexity &#8212; with very interesting global regularities in the images, but it&#8217;s not really a &#8220;system&#8221; in the sense you seem to be talking about&#8230;. no bunches of interacting elements, no dynamic &#8220;behavior&#8221;.  With this question I&#8217;m trying to probe the sorts of things your definition applies to.</p>
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		<title>Comment on The definition of &#8220;complexity&#8221; by Derek Zahn</title>
		<link>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-53</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Zahn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2008 19:36:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://susaro.com/archives/24#comment-53</guid>
		<description>One quick clarification: Let's suppose that some sort of device is throwing these dice in a fairly consistent force and direction.  Still, because of dependence on initial conditions, the path of the dice is only predictable in a general sort of way, and some fraction of the time the dice bounce out of the table entirely.  Despite your not thinking this is a regularity, I have to insist that it is:  it is kind of amazing that such a radically different result occurs occasionally.  To repeat, though, I can accept that it can be "easily" explained (that is, with a small theory) as long as we are not interested in predicting which specific throws will bounce out of the table or making an accurate estimate of what fraction of throws will do so.  And I can accept the view that the specific fraction is scientifically unintersting (and therefore does not need explaining with a large theory), with some minor reservations.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>One quick clarification: Let&#8217;s suppose that some sort of device is throwing these dice in a fairly consistent force and direction.  Still, because of dependence on initial conditions, the path of the dice is only predictable in a general sort of way, and some fraction of the time the dice bounce out of the table entirely.  Despite your not thinking this is a regularity, I have to insist that it is:  it is kind of amazing that such a radically different result occurs occasionally.  To repeat, though, I can accept that it can be &#8220;easily&#8221; explained (that is, with a small theory) as long as we are not interested in predicting which specific throws will bounce out of the table or making an accurate estimate of what fraction of throws will do so.  And I can accept the view that the specific fraction is scientifically unintersting (and therefore does not need explaining with a large theory), with some minor reservations.</p>
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